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TOWARD "CONSTITUTIONALIZING" THE
CORPORATION: A SPECULATIVE ESSAY
ARTHUR S. MILLER*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1215 the barons of England stared down King John on the
meadows of Runnymede and wrested from him the Magna Carta.
For them, it was a famous victory: it began the process by which
the power of the sovereign was formally limited by law. The rights
there gained were eventually extended to commoners and given
expression in the Bill of Rights to the American Constitution,
which has as its core concept due process of law.' As is evidenced
by the Supreme Court's incorporation of most of the first eight
amendments into the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, a development that wrought a silent constitutional revolu-
tion (beginning with the Gitlow case in 1925 and ending in the
1960s),2 due process is the fundamental limitation on government
at all levels. Not an absolute, it is nonetheless a command of "a
legally-concretized requirement of reasonableness '3 directed to-
ward public officials in their treatment of persons within the
United States, whether natural or artificial, citizen or alien.
Today, due process has two, perhaps three, dimensions: proce-
dural, substantive, and "affirmative." It tells public officers, in
* Professor, George Washington University National Law Center. Professor
Miller was edudated at Willamette, Stanford, and Yale; he has published works on
the Constitution, the modem corporate state, and presidential power; and he has
served as consultant for several prestigious government committees and private
institutions (during 1973-74 he was Chief Consultant to the Senate Select Commit-
tee on Presidential Campaign Activities).
The Bill of Rights was added to the Constitution in 1791. Nearly two centu-
ries later, a serious movement for a written bill of rights surfaced in Great Britain,
mainly, it seems, to halt the allegedly overweening influence of the labor unions.
See Miller, A Bill of Rights to Protect Our Liberties?, 47 POL. QTLY. 137 (1976).
" Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). Due process, of course, is not
limited by the specifics of the Bill of Rights. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46
(1947) (Murphy, J., dissenting); See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
McWhinney, The Power Value and Its Public Law Gradations: A Preliminary
Excursus, 9 J. PuB. L. 43, 44 (1960).
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theory at least, how they must act (procedure), what they can do
(substantive), and, at times, what they must do (affirmative).'
Now, almost two centuries after the Bill of Rights was added
to the Constitution and more than seven centuries since the Great
Charter was promulgated, the time has come to think hard and
seriously of the need for a new Magna Carta that will limit not only
the power of the State (public government) but also the vast and
growing powers of the private governments of the nation. These
decentralized wielders of political power-the giant corporations,
the labor unions, the large foundations, the big universities, the
veterans legions, the farmers leagues-are only ostensibly private.
They are in fact as public as is, say, the National Aeronautics and
Space Agency. As the late Professor Wolfgang Friedmann wrote,
"[t]he corporate organizations of business [and, presumably,
other social groups] have long ceased to be private phenomena.
That they have a direct and decisive impact on the social, eco-
nomic, and political life of the nation is no longer a matter of
argument. '"' We live, in short, in a corporate society:
In law there are ... two major kinds of persons: physical per-
sons of the sort that you and I know, indeed are, which the law
calls "natural persons," and "juristic persons." These "juristic
persons" are intangible entities which none of us natural per-
sons has ever seen. They include what we commonly think of
as corporations, along with many other entities: churches, cer-
tain clubs, trade associations, labor unions, professional asso-
ciations, towns, and others. In law, these persons must be
treated somewhat differently from natural persons: they have
no fixed life span, and thus may exist in perpetuity, they have
no corpus, and thus cannot be physically imprisoned (though
they can be punished in other ways, including death, a sentence
not infrequently imposed by judges), they have no intrinsic ca-
pacity of acting, and so must act through agents in the form of
natural persons.
One might ask, to all this, "So what's new?" The answer
is that the modern corporation, the juristic person formed for
specific purposes by its members, is new, and its presence has
For preliminary inquiries into the affirmative nature of due process, see
Miller, An Affirmative Thrust to Due Process of Law?, 30 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 399
(1962); Miller, Toward a Concept of Constitutional Duty, 1968 Sup. CT. REV. 199
(1968).
1 Friedmann, Corporate Power, Government by Private Groups, and the Law,
57 COLUM. L. REv. 155 (1957).
[Vol. 80
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CONSTITUTIONALIZING
created societies with different structural foundations than
those which existed in the past.6
My purpose in this speculative essay is to suggest that the
corporate society should be made amenable to the fundamental
principle of due process of law in all of its dimensions. This can
be done quite easily. It would merely take a Supreme Court deci-
sion or a series of decisions. No statute is necessary; nor is a consti-
tutional amendment. In briefest terms, the concept of governmen-
tal action under the Constitution needs to be expanded to cover
the significant social groups of the nation. Like natural persons,
juristic persons should be held to the view that citizenship has its
duties as well as its rights.' A Constitution that permits a person
to be marched up to the front, there to be shot at and perhaps to
be killed for his country, should be sufficiently flexible to hold
corporate America to analogous duties.
I am not suggesting that juristic persons be sent to their
deaths. I do suggest, however, the somewhat more reasonable prop-
osition that any group which in fact wields enormous governing
power should be made to adhere to the principles of liberty and
justice that permeate the Bill of Rights. This is not a new idea,'
but it is an idea whose time should come, and soon, even though
the present Supreme Court is stoutly opposed to it. This essay,
then, suggests what ought to be, rather than what is, in the law
enunciated by the Supreme Court and other constitutional
decision-making bodies.
Some people, Ralph Nader being an obvious example, believe
that an "employee bill of rights" can and should come about
through the medium of federal incorporation of the giant business
corporation.' No doubt it could but, as will be shown, that concept
is insufficient to the need. The corporate presence in the United
States goes far beyond the giant business corporation, even though
that economic entity doubtless is the most important of the private
power centers of the nation. This is truly "an age of collective
action,"10 and the time has come to make that fact manifest in the
law of the Constitution. 1
a J. COLEMAN, PowER AND THE STRucTURE OF SocIErY 13-14 (1974) (emphasis
added).
I Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944). This is not to say that
the corporation is a constitutional "citizen"; it is not.
A. PEKEUS, LAW AND SoCIAL ACrON (M. Konvitz ed. 1970).
R. NADER Er AL, TAMING THE GirAN CORPORATION (1976).
W J. COMMONS, THE ECONOMICS OF CoLLEacrIvE AcION 23 (1950).
" The discussion here concentrates on the giant business corporation, but only
3
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II. ARGUMENT
A. Development of the Corporation
In 1886 one of the most remarkable feats of legal legerdemain
in history occurred when the Supreme Court, without even hearing
argument on the matter, asserted that corporations were "persons"
within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment.'" Since that
time the legal fiction that corporations are the same as natural
persons has so solidified in American law that one may be par-
doned his belief that, indeed, corporations are a part of the natural
scheme of things.
A moment's reflection and a glance at history, however, will
show the contrary: the corporation-certainly the giant entity
which straddles the continent and sets the character of the econ-
omy-is a latecomer. Corporations did not appear in any signifi-
cant number until after the Civil War, and it was well into the
twentieth century before the enormous enterprises now so familiar
made their appearance.
During colonial days and up to the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury corporations were relatively rare. American business was car-
ried on by small entrepreneurs, by individuals, or in partnerships.
The stock market did not exist, and trading in corporate securities
was unknown. Labor unions were in the future (the movement to
organize the work force of corporate enterprises did not fructify
until the 1930s). The United States was, during its formative years,
a weak collection of agricultural and small-shop sovereignties
perched precariously on the shoulder of North America and exist-
ing largely at the sufferance of the established powers in Europe.
Less than two centuries later it had become the strongest and
wealthiest nation in history.
The familiar history of the transformation need not be re-
traced at this time, but attention may be directed toward one
feature of that history and development: the immense changes
for the purpose of sharpening the focus. The same ideas are applicable to other
groups.
22 Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886). See Graham, The
"Conspiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 YALE L. J. 371, 48 Law J.
171 (1938). The personality of the corporation is, to be sure, a legal fiction, but
surely one of the most enduring of all fictions and one that has had significant
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from 1800 to the present have taken place with essentially the same
Constitution in effect. The document that was drafted in 1787,
promulgated in 1789, and amended with the Bill of Rights in 1791,
now serves a nation different in almost every way from that which
existed in the eighteenth century. Without dwelling upon the ques-
tion. of how such a politico-legal document as the Constitution
could survive virtually intact during that period of great change,
consider another question which relates to the corporation (and
trade union). That question is posed by artificially transplanting
the corporate entity and trade union possessing powers proportion-
ate to their present ones into American society at the time of the
drafting of the Bill of Rights (1787). Assume the corporations and
unions dominated eighteenth-century colonial life as they do
American life today. Obviously, the only social force even remotely
capable of challenging and controlling the corporate community is
government; and government, despite all its vast powers and ex-
tended activities, does not even at the present time, have the
power to control the corporation.' 3 Given that supposition, what
provision would the Founding Fathers have made in the Constitu-
tion for the corporation and the union?'"
It is, of course, impossible to answer that question definitively.
Obviously one cannot read into the minds of men long dead what
they thought about a matter which did not exist during their life-
times. One can, however, devote attention to the constitutional
position of the corporation in the future. The corporation should
be so assimilated into constitutional theory that not only is it
subject to the limitations of the Constitution but also it is held to
affirmative duties in furtherance of the public interest. 5
What is "the corporation"? The question is not easily an-
swered, save in generalities. For our purposes, however, "the corpo-
ration" is any one of the 500 largest business concerns listed an-
nually in Fortune magazine. The figure is an arbitrary one and is
used merely for purposes of analysis. These are the industrial and
'1 Compare Stone, supra note 11, with A. MIaLE, THE MODERN CORPORATE
STATE: PRIvATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (i976).
"1 It is desirable to view the corporation as an entity made up of several dispar-
ate elements, including, but not limited to, corporate managers, the stockholders,
the rank-and-file of union membership, and the union leaders. See Miller, supra
note 12, for fuller discussion of the corporate community.
1* I fully recognize the inherent ambiguity of the term "the public interest" and
the difficulty, perhaps impossibility, of defining it. See Miller, The Public Interest
Undefined, 10 J. Pun. L. 184 (1961).
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commercial giants which span the continent and which have so
altered the historical model of the market that former economic
and legal concepts now need reexamination. General Motors, U.S.
Steel, A.T.&T., A.&P., Ford Motor Company, Sears Roebuck,
General Dynamics, all exemplify the corporate enterprise of which
we speak. Within each of the major functional areas of economic
activity, a handful of large corporations-two to five, as a
rule-supply the bulk of the goods and services. The free market
extolled in song and oratory is gone-if, indeed, it ever existed. In
its place is "oligopoly": the domination of the market by a few
enterprises. Some economists still long nostalgically for the classic
free market. They illustrate what author and former judge Thur-
man Arnold was fond of asserting: "economics is theology."" They
display a touching faith in a bygone age-one which may never
have existed save in their imaginations.
The corporation, furthermore, consists of a number of differ-
ent interest groups. At least six may be identified. First, there are
the ostensible owners, the shareholders who own the stock. These
do not control; and rather than owning the corporation, they may
more accurately be said to own shares entitling them to whatever
dividends the managers (those who do in fact control) see fit to
allow." The second group is comprised of those same managers.
The managerial structure is matched in many corporations by the
top leadership of the trade union having jurisdiction over the par-
ticular enterprise. A fourth group is made up of the rank-and-file
workers. Then there are the suppliers to the corporation, and, in
some cases (notably the automobile industry), the franchise deal-
ers of the mother corporation. Finally, as a sixth group, there are
the consumers of the product. The pattern varies in some instan-
ces, but it may nevertheless be said that the corporation is a collec-
tivity with at least those six disparate segments. A seventh inter-
est-the over-all public interest-is also involved.
But the infant which in 1886 the Supreme Court declared to
be a "person" in the eyes of the law and under the Constitution
has grown into a constituency which in some instances numbers in
the hundreds of thousands and involves an annual budget often
running into the billions. Because it is legally a person, that consti-
"See, e.g., T. ARNOLD, FAin FIGHTS AND FouL (1965).
" The divorce of ownership from control has been part of the accepted wisdom
since Berle and Means published their seminal work. A. BERE & G. MwNs, THE
MODERN CORPORATON AND PRIVATE PRoPmrTY (1932).
[Vol. 80
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tuency enjoys the protections afforded by the fourteenth amend-
ment, which provides that a state shall not "deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law. . ." A simi-
lar provision in the fifth amendment limits the power of the federal
government. Although corporations and other social groups are not
mentioned specifically in the Constitution, lawyers' magic has
managed to include them. For several decades the due process
clauses were used by the Court to strike down legislative action
which interfered with the liberty protected by the fourteenth
amendment. Attempts to limit maximum hours of labor in in-
dustrial work and to set minimum wages were held by the Court
to violate the liberty of the corporation and also, ironically, of the
wage-earners who were the subject of the legislation. That fifty-
year period, it may be said, marked a classic instance of judicial
legislation by the United States Supreme Court. The corporation
enjoyed the protection of the Constitution without suffering any
accompanying obligation to live up to the letter or spirit of the
fundamental law.
It is one thing, however, to say that a corporation is a person
and quite another to delineate the nature of that artificial person.
The serious question is whether the American business corpora-
tion, which has waxed strong under the American constitutional
order, will now be required to accept the duties of a person in the
legal sense." Since natural persons (human beings) have certain
duties and responsibilities under the constitutional system, should
artificial persons have corresponding ones? Much is heard about
the social responsibility of the businessman. Whether that respon-
sibility is or should be legally recognized is our question.
B. Altering the Constitution
The rise of an organizational basis to American society has
brought severe stresses to bear upon the Constitution. When the
fundamental law was written in 1787 the framers of the Constitu-
tion envisaged but two legal entities: the individual person and the
government. Nothing intermediate was contemplated. 9 But since
about 1870 "there has been a worldwide increase in the number,
11 It may be noted in passing that while the corporation is a person under the
Constitution it is not a citizen-a distinction which delights lawyers but tends to
puzzle others.
"1 In fact, James Madison argued that the chief merit of the Constitution lay
in its attempts to lessen the disasters of factional ambition. 1 V. PARmNGTON, MAIN
CuRREnS IN AMaRCAN THOUGHT, 285 (1927) re The Federalist Papers No. 10..
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size, and power of organizations. . .whose activity is directed to-
ward the economic betterment of their members.""0
The corporation-union, which we call the corporate com-
munity, is at once the most powerful and pervasive of these organi-
zations. It has become apparent that these large economic organi-
zations are here to stay, however much some may long for a Tho-
reauvian bean patch or a Jeffersonian commonwealth, because
they perform functions which are considered desirable, even essen-
tial, by most Americans. They have even attained intellectual ac-
ceptance."
But their presence poses such crucial questions about the na-
ture of the constitutional order that it is fair to say that in at least
four ways corporate activities have altered the basic fabric of the
constitutional scheme. The growth in the number of economic or-
ganizations is not the only cause of this change, but it is certainly
one of the principal factors. The American businessman who con-
siders himself to be conservative, is, oddly enough, one of the most
radical, not to say revolutionary, figures in America today.
First, corporate communities, by creating a truly national
economy, have so altered the historical nature of the federal sys-
tem that it is no longer recognizable: the marriage of technology
to economics has produced in the corporation an economic order
which obliterates state lines; but a decentralized political order
still exists in the fifty separate state governments. The conse-
quence strains historical federalism. A nation which began with a
system of "dual" federalism, with the states the more powerful
segment, has now become one of "national" federalism, or more
accurately, "national cooperative" federalism. Policies are enunci-
ated in Washington and law follows, either in the form of uniform
state laws or through congressional legislation taking over and oc-
cupying an entire field of regulation. The development may be
seen clearly in the vast and growing system of federal grants-in-
aid-a system whereby federal appropriations are used to accom-
plish what appear to be purely local ends. Examples are urban
redevelopment, highway construction, airport construction, and
the welter of policies administered by the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare. Increasingly, therefore, the states are be-
coming administrative districts for centrally established policies.
K. BOULDING, THE ORGANIZATIONAL REVOLUTION (1953).
2 A. ByRLE, THE TwENTum CENTURY CAPrrAAST REVOLUTION (1954); D. LILIEN-
THAL, BIG Bususss: A NEW ERA (1952).
[Vol. 80
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One of the forces which greatly influenced that basic constitutional
change was the growth of national corporate communities.
A second alteration wrought by burgeoning economic organi-
zation involves the impingement upon individual liberty by cen-
ters of economic power. The Founding Fathers feared governmen-
tal despotism and wrote into the Constitution limitations upon
official power. They did not, however, foresee the power of private
groups, power which in some instances can be as despotic as the
government and surely as onerous to human freedom. For instance,
a union with a closed-shop agreement can prevent some willing
laborers from obtaining jobs. Similarly, a corporation can often
treat its suppliers and franchise dealers, not to mention its mana-
gerial employees, in a manner which severely limits their liberty.
The Founding Fathers well knew that power over a man's subsist-
ence amounts to a power over his will: "necessitous men are not
free men."
Third, just as the corporate communities have largely erased
state lines as far as commerce is concerned, so today are they in
the process of dimming national boundaries. Business has burst
outward from a predominantly national market and is racing to-
ward a multinational, if not a truly international, economy. For
the American businessman the development is fairly recent. Since
the end of the Second World War a process has taken place which,
when finally completed, will likely be as important constitution-
ally as was the "nationalizing" of the economy in the period of
1870-1950. Restlessly seeking markets and raw materials, the cor-
porate manager is roaming the world and setting up new economic
forms which at some time may be transformed into new political
and legal systems. In short, a new economic order seems to be in
the making, at the core of which is the corporate community ex-
panding its horizons to include at least a multinational perspec-
tive.
In 1960, David E. Lilienthal presaged what would take place
during the ensuing quarter century. He foresaw that by 1985 it
would be as common to operate industrial enterprises in a number
of foreign countries as it was then for large American manufactur-
ing enterprises to operate in several states of the Union. One result
would be the establishment of new supranational authorities. That
this would pose new challenges to the Constitution of 1787 is ob-
vious. Lilienthal believes that the development will be toward a
new form of federalism, with multinational corporations existing
9
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as "prominent citizens living under the developing economies.""
Speaking in a different context, then-Chairman of the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee, Senator J. William Fulbright, put the
matter in this way: "The question we face is whether our basic
constitutional machinery, admirably suited to the needs of a re-
mote agrarian republic in the eighteenth century, is adequate for
the formulation and conduct of foreign policy of a twentieth-
century nation, pre-eminent in political and military power and
burdened with all the enormous responsibilities that accompany
such power." 2 To the extent that private corporations transcend
national boundaries in their operations they contribute to the
acute problem of adapting the Constitution of 1787 to the problems
of the modem era.
Fourth, the rise of corporate communities has contributed to
the diffusion of political power. The Constitution was drafted in
its original form so as to fragment the powers of government by use
of the federal-state system, by division on geographical lines, and
by a tripartite division within the federal government itself. The
theory was simple: splinter power to prevent despotism, the con-
centration of power in one man or one group. Liberty was to be
preserved through the inevitable conflicts of organizations and offi-
cials sharing power over the same subject matter.2
Well and good: the constitutional system has indeed worked
well for the 190 years of American constitutional history. But it has
done so as much because of factors lying outside the Constitution
itself, and even outside the political order, as it has because of
intrinsic merit. Why? For one thing, the problems faced by Amer-
ica during most of its history (up to very recent years) were inter-
nal-i.e., domestic-in origin. Only since World War II has the
question of the adaptability of the Constitution to external prob-
lems become acute. A serious question of the day is whether the
fragmentation of power established by the Constitution works to
the benefit of the American people as a whole when it comes to
foreign affairs.
Furthermore, the Constitution may have survived because, in
2 Lilienthal, The Multinational Corporation, in MANAOEMENT AND CORPORA-
TINS, 1985 (Anshen & Bach eds. 1960).
n Fulbright, American Foreign Policy in the 20th Century Under an 18th-
Century Constitution, 47 CoRNEiLL L. Q. 1, 1 (1961).
U Recent scholarship has suggested that there was an efficiency side to separa-
tion of powers. See L. FIsHER, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: POWER AND POLICY (1972).
[Vol. 80
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part, it has not been a barrier to the realization of the reasonable
goals of the American people: the fundamental law has, by con-
tinuing to adapt, been sufficient to the needs of the people in
different times and under different conditions. Our Constitution is
a living instrument of governance; rather than being "a mere law-
yers' document," it is "the vehicle of a nation's life."' Chief Jus-
tice John Marshall put the point in classic form when he empha-
sized that "we [i.e., the Supreme Court] must never forget that
it is a constitution we are expounding."2' That Constitution, he
went on to say, was intended to endure for ages to come and,
consequently, to be adapted to meet various crises of human af-
fairs.
That adaptation has been effected by all organs of govern-
ment, national and local. Congress and the President have made
important constitutional decisions, although lawyers, speaking
with invincible parochialism, often assert that the Supreme Court
is the only organ worth studying for constitutional decisions. That,
however, is simply not so. The procedure by which the Constitu-
tion is updated by succeeding generations includes other organs of
government as well, although the Supreme Court has been central
to that process. Supreme Court decisions have had the effect of
making legitimate vast constitutional changes wrought initially by
other segments of government, both national and state.
The system has worked, also, because leaders of the disparate
political branches of government have been willing to cooperate
more often than not. The federal system and the separation-of-
powers doctrine, although designed to limit power, were based as
well on the assumption that political leaders would act as reasona-
ble men and cooperate where the general good of the people was
involved. (Only one time in American history did this assumption
fail: during the Civil War.) "Government is not a body of blind
forces; it is a body of men, with highly differentiated functions, no
doubt, in our modem day of specialization, but with a common
W. WILSON, CoNsTuTIoNAL GovENmENT IN Tm UNrrED STATES (1908).
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (18i9). McCulloch, of
course gave birth to the implied powers concept which deals with the first part of
the necessary and proper clause. Almost sixteen decades later a constitutional
argument is brewing concerning the second, "forgotten," half of that clause. See
Pressler v. Simon, 428 F. Supp. 302 (D.D.C. 1976); and Van Alstyne, The Role of
Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of the President and of the Federal
Courts, 36 Oino ST. L.J. 788 (1975).
11
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task and purpose. Their cooperation is indispensable, their warfare
fatal.
' '2
Fragmentation of power has worked, therefore, only because
it has at times been ignored.2 Even so, to return to the fourth
constitutional challenge, the proliferation of economic and other
power centers within American society poses the question of
whether such splintering has been carried too far. If so, is there a
corrective? We have noted above how power-fragmentation, in the
views of some observers, is not desirable in the conduct of foreign
affairs. Focus now upon the complementary aspect: domestic af-
fairs. In order to discern the nature of the problem the process
established by the Constitution for making public policy must be
analyzed: how do such decisions get made in fact. Reduced to its
essentials, the decision-making model set up by the framers of the
Constitution is simple enough: Congress legislates law, the Presi-
dent executes that law, and the judiciary interprets it. The model
is too simple, however, because no government, certainly not that
of the United States, ever operated in such a fashion. No thought-
ful student of American government today believes that the tasks
of governing can be placed in three such mutually interlocking
watertight compartments. Even so, as recently as 1952 the Su-
preme Court apparently adhered to such a model. In the case
involving President Truman's seizure of the steel mills the Court
held that the President had no independent lawmaking author-
ity.2 Only Congress, according to the Court, can make a law; and
presidential lawmaking is invalid." Speaking generally, it is fair to
say that the decision of the Court was faulty both historically and
as a matter of contemporary practice. If such a model ever did
exist, the increase of decentralized power within the American
polity has substantially warped that simplistic model of constitu-
tional decision-making. Since the line between what historically
has been considered to be public and what private has been
blurred, even erased at times, by the growth of the group basis of
society and the consequent interaction with government, a serious
question thereby posed is how the government, given the system
" Wilson, supra note 20, at 56-7.
z See E. CORWIN, THE PRESMENT: OFFICE AND POWERS (4th ed. 1957) (noting
the aggrandizement of power in the executive); A. MmuLa, PRESIDENTIAL POWER N
A NuTSHmEL (1977).
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as it has developed, can insure that "national interest" decisions
are made by the leaders of the centers of private power?
Not long ago, advocates of pluralism saw a need for greater
recognition of social groups within a nation. Now, however, "the
question must be raised in all seriousness whether the 'overmighty
subjects' of our time-the giant corporations, both of a commercial
and non-commercial character, the labor unions, the trade associa-
tions, farmers' organizations, veterans' legions, and some other
highly organized groups-have taken over the substance of sover-
eignty."'" Public policy in the United States appears to require a
consensus of the groups most affected, beneficially or adversely, by
those policies. Policies sanctioned by the lowest common denomi-
nator among interest groups are the ones which are adopted be-
cause they please the most people and offend the fewest. This
means that government-(i.e., the State)-is not all-powerful. It
cannot operate as it wishes, and it cannot fail to take into serious
consideration the demands and wishes of our organizational so-
ciety.
Outlined above have been four ways in which the offspring of
the marriage of technology to economics-the corporation-has
substantially altered the historical Constitution. Attention should
be directed toward a constitutional theory which will encompass
both the historical learning and the present and future social facts.
Of the four challenges to American constitutionalism which have
been mentioned, two raise questions which are of central import-
ance today. First, to what extent should an individual be able to
invoke the Constitution as a restraint upon arbitrary action taken
by private groups which affect his values? Second, to what extent
can private groups make decisions that are truly national?
The first question involves the historical development of con-
stitutional law and could be answered by a relatively small change
in the present flow of decisions dealing with constitutional con-
struction. If the corporate community is a "private" government,
as has been suggested, should it be treated as such under the
Constitution? The second question presents a political problem of
the first magnitude and strikes'at the heart of the American Con-
stitution.
3' Friedmann, supra note 5, at 165.
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C. Limiting Private Power
The corporate community (taken here as the model of private
groups) exercises two types of power. On one hand, it makes deci-
sions relating to the direction and intensity of investment, the
nature of economic development, and other similar economic fac-
tors. On the other hand, it makes decisions which directly affect
an individual and his values. The first group of decisions may be
considered by some as creating a situation that demands public or
external control. Control techniques might entail total socializa-
tion through mixed public and private enterprises, cooperatives,
mixed companies, capital and labor partnerships, public regula-
tion by commission, and antitrust legislation or other similar social
restraints. While all of these raise peripheral constitutional ques-
tions, not one calls for the application of constitutional precepts
to the decisions of the corporate community; indeed, in this aspect
of the group decision-making process it is difficult to see how the
Constitution could be validly applied. Control, if it were imposed,
would not be through the means of resort to a basic higher lAw.
In the second category of decisions-those that directly affect
the value position of individuals-the question arises whether the
Constitution can and should be applied to private exercises of
power. The Constitution is often said to run against governments
only. Is it now time to recognize the dimension of private
governments?
We can start with the following propositions:
(1) The Constitution was framed on the theory that limita-
tions should exist on the formal exercise of power in government
but not on power exercised unofficially.
(2) The essential element of individual liberty, however, is
freedom from any arbitrary restraints or restrictions, wherever and
however imposed.
And we can conclude that:
The Constitution should be so construed as to limit all arbi-
trary applications of power against the individual-whether exer-
cised by the government or by private power groups. The main flow
of group decisions in the corporate community would not be
thrown into litigation or controversy by such a constitutional con-
struction, but only those which directly and substantially affect an
individual. Furthermore, it would take only slight modification of
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Hobbes once likened private associations to "worms in the
entrails of man" and sought ways to minimize their influence.
Madison, in The Federalist Papers, dealt extensively with them.
The problem is not how to eliminate them but how to curb their
excesses. One way of doing this, insofar as individuals are con-
cerned, is through application of the basic limitations of the Con-
stitution to certain group decisions: Governing power, wherever
located, should be subject to the fundamental constitutional limi-
tation of due process of law. This proposition, as it is worded,
excludes the great majority of group decisions-those which do not
directly affect an individual-as well as all nonarbitrary uses of
power. It assumes that groups such as the corporate community
have responsibilities as well as rights under the Constitution, and
one of those responsibilities is not to act arbitrarily toward certain
individuals.
Let us consider two different situations in order to see how the
proposition would operate. Take the situation where an employee
of a corporate community is discharged from his job for the an
nounced reason that his loyalty to the United States is in question.
Should he be accorded "due process of law"? Would it make any
difference if the enterprise were one which had a number of federal
contracts, as distinguished from an enterprise depending entirely
on non-governmental business? Or take the situation where a
member of an ethnic group, say a Negro, is denied employment
because of his race. Should he be able to contest that decision on
constitutional grounds? If so, under what theory should he
proceed?
The basic proposition would cover both of these situations.
The factory worker discharged for loyalty reasons should be af-
forded "procedural" due process of law; the Negro denied employ-
ment should be granted rights under a theory of equal protection
of the laws, or, possibly, a theory of "substantive" due process. For
both, the constitutional problem is essentially the same: persuad-
ing the United States Supreme Court to recognize that the corpo-
rate community performs some governmental functions.
The historical trend of judicial decision making has been to
bring more and more organizational activity within the reach of
the limitations of the Constitution. (That trend has been halted,
at least for a time, by recent Supreme Court decisions.32) Since
22 E.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 96 Sup. Ct. 1029 (1976).
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1789, moreover, public governmental activity has increasingly
been made subject to due process limitations. The next logical step
would be to draw private governments into the tent of state action.
This is not a particularly startling proposition, for a number of
Supreme Court cases have shown that the concept of private action
must yield to a concept of state action where public functions are
being performed. State courts in Kansas and California have
reached similar decisions. Compare the following statements of,
respectively, the United States Supreme Court and the California
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court comments that
[If the Railway Labor Act confers an exclusive bargaining
power on a union] . . . without any commensurate statutory
duty toward its members, constitutional questions arise. For
the representative is clothed with power not unlike that of a
legislature which is subject to constitutional limitations on its
power to deny, restrict, destroy or discriminate against the
rights of those for whom it legislates and which is also under an
affirmative constitutional duty equally to protect those rights.Y
In like manner the California court writes:
. . . Where a union has. . . attained a monopoly of the supply
of labor by means of closed shop agreements and other forms
of collective labor action, such a union occupies a quasi public
position similar to that of a public service business and it has
certain corresponding obligations. It may no longer claim the
same freedom from legal restraint enjoyed by golf clubs or fra-
ternal associations. Its asserted right to choose its own members
does not merely relate to social relations; it affects the funda-
mental right to work for a living.u
Recent Supreme Court decisions have backed off from this
trend. It is my contention that these recent decisions have been
wrong in theory and sociologically arbitrary.- What is true of a
labor union is certainly true of the corporate community of which
the union is a part. When an employee is discharged or threatened
with discharge from the community, a compelling argument can
be made that this should not be done in an arbitrary way. The
employee should get "his day in court"; he should have due process
of law. His capacity to earn a living, perhaps the most important
value he has, is directly affected. If we go a step further and find
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 198 (1944).
31 James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 731, 155 P.2d 329, 335 (1944).




West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 2 [1978], Art. 3
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol80/iss2/3
CONSTITUTIONALIZING
that the enterprise for which he works is the recipient of federal
contracts, the employee should be able to invoke the due-process
clause of the fifth amendment in addition. The employer can be
considered to be an agent of the federal government, clothed with
the protection of that government, and therefore subject to the
same constitutional limitations as the federal government.
The same arguments would appear to be equally applicable to
the Negro in the second example. He is not yet a member of the
community to which he has applied for a job, and not yet subject
to its governing power, but he is being subjected to its arbitrary
power. Whether the attack on that power is based on equal-
protection grounds or on substantive due-process grounds, the
problem would again be to convince the Supreme Court that the
conduct of the corporate community was a form of state action. If
the particular enterprise that refused the job were a federal con-
tractor, there would seem to be no insuperable barrier to the
Negro's invoking the due-process clause of the fifth amendment.
These are the types of decisions made by the corporate com-
munity, whether by corporate management or union management,
that should be subject to constitutional proscriptions. Possibly the
bulk of decisions, if controlled at all, would have to be met with
other techniques-probably legislation by Congress or by the
growth of countervailing power centers.
D. The Problem of Consensus
"There can be no grosser mistake," observed Sir Henry
Maine, than the impression that "Democracy differs from Mon-
archy in essence. . . .The tests of success in the performance of
the necessary and natural duties of a government are precisely the
same in both cases."3 Those "necessary and natural duties" of
government are the defense and advancement abroad of the vital
interests of the nation, and of order, security, and solvency at
home. Can the American constitutional democracy insure the
making of the "hard" decisions-those that assert a national or
public interest against private inclination and against what is easy
and popular? Or is there a Gresham's law of politics in which the
"soft" decisions tend to triumph over the "hard" ones? These are
tough questions which go to the heart of American constitution-
alism.
11 H. MAINE, PoPuLAR GovERNMENT 60-61 (1886).
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Our Constitution is largely a charter for the resolution of
purely domestic matters. Although war is mentioned, the framers
obviously considered international peace to be the normal state of
affairs. The original constitutional theory of limited govern-
ment-that government is best which governs least-is no longer
tenable. The essential negativism of the Constitution toward gov-
ernment requires alteration in the light of the affirmative duties
of the State."?
The national or public interest must have an authoritative
spokesman. In the constitutional system as it exists today, how-
ever, no one, not even the President, can speak for this interest.
Our pluralistic society needs to reach common agreement on
values and ideals and needs to be willing to sacrifice for the general
good. Even once consensus is reached it must reflect more than the'
normal bargaining and compromises: it must in some way tran-
scend parochial interests and reach the overall public interest. The
last forty years illustrate the nature of the problem.
' In the 1930s, after much political battle, Congress enacted
legislation which had the effect of legitimizing labor unions in all
industries engaged in interstate commerce (which, as we have
seen, encompasses most business activity). The Supreme Court, in
a famous decision in 1937, upheld the statute-the National Labor
Relations Act 3 -which meant that corporate management and
union leadership were left to the bargaining table to settle such
matters as wages, hours, and working conditions of employees.
Although Congress did not say so expressly, the system of collec-
tive bargaining was based on the assumption that the decisions
reached thereby would be in the public or national interest. In
other words, Congress, assuming that the general good would be
served thereby, intervened in the economy to permit unions to
balance the power of corporations.
Unfortunately, the system has not continued to work in the
same way. In the intervening years what appears to have happened
frequently is that corporate managers and union leaders get to-
gether for their mutual benefit, and little or no attention is paid
to the public interest. Wages have risen, but, so have prices. The
result is inflation and an inability to compete on the world market
to protect the international viability of the dollar. The situation
See Miller, supra note 12, on the rise of the "positive state".
1-1 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
[Vol. 80
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became so acute in the late 1950s and 1960s, that the President,
at the instance of his Council of Economic Advisers, sought to set
guidelines for wage and price increases' which were to be taken
into consideration by those who sat around the collective-
bargaining table; in effect, it was an attempt to put a "third
man"-john Q. Public-at that table.
At this writing it appears that the federal government is again
making not-so-gentle hints to members of the corporate com-
munity. Whether government will prevail is at best uncertain, but
history can provide some guidance. In 1962, a famous showdown
between President Kennedy and Roger Blough of the United
States Steel Corporation over an announced rise in the price of
steel provided clear evidence of the relative inability of govern-
ment to insist upon national-interest decisions by the leaders of
private centers of economic power. President Kennedy won the
battle, but U.S. Steel won the war because it soon raised steel
prices.
The unhappy episode of wage-price controls under President
Nixon provides another example. Another illustration, drawn from
the penumbral area where international and constitutional law
meet and merge, should buttress the point. Since the end of the
Second World War, a cardinal tenet of American economic policy
has been to expand a system of multilateral world trade carried on
with few if any, national barriers. The drive culminated with the
enactment of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and the so-called
"Kennedy Round" of tariff negotiations conducted in 1964. It has,
even so, become clear that efforts since 1945 to make meaningful
changes in international trade policy have often foundered on the
shoals of domestic group interests. The International Trade Organ-
ization, negotiated in the late 1940s, became a dead issue because
the United States would not join it; the same happened to the
Organization for Trade Cooperation, negotiated in 1955, and
strongly endorsed by President Eisenhower. The point is that what
the President and many others thought was in the national interest
had to give way to parochial interests which feared the impact of
expanded trade.
Decisions such as these, taken by corporate communities
themselves or by a government strongly influenced by those com-
n See Auerbach, Presidential Administration of Prices and Wages, 35 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 191 (1966).
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munities, create a problem for consensus in a group-dominated
society. The challenge remains to find a legal-i.e., constitu-
tional-basis for a decision-making process that would be reasona-
bly calculated to further the national interest. The challenge sur-
passes that of dealing with the growth of corporate centers of
power, because it seeks to preserve the democratic values imbed-
ded in the Constitution while simultaneously devising ways to
transcend the shortcomings of mass democracy. It is no exaggera-
tion to say that the American constitutional system will prosper
or founder according to the manner in which this challenge is met.
I. CONCLUSION
Terming the corporation a person, as the Supreme Court did
in 1886, does not begin to solve the problem of the place of the
corporate community in the American constitutional order. The
question, it should be emphasized, is not whether the corporation
should receive the protections of the Constitution. Of course it
should, but being a constitutional person carries with it obligations
as well. Natural persons are held to constitutional duties-there
should be a concept of constitutional duty for the corporate com-
munity. This duty, which is now in an unformed and inchoate
state, has at least two facets. First, the corporate community (as
defined above) should be held to minimum standards of decent
treatment of individuals it directly affects; these standards are
summed up in the concept of due process of law, which in short-
hand, non-legal terminology means that the government should
not deal with anyone in an arbitrary manner. Second, the corpo-
rate community should take cognizance of the overall interests of
the American people when making basic decisions, such as those
affecting wages and prices; in other words, it should take the pub-
lic interest into account. As one observer of the legal scene suc-
cinctly put it: "Any system of public law can be vital only so far
as it is based on a given sanction to the following rules: First, the
holders of power cannot do certain things; second, there are certain
things they must do.""
Should the federal judiciary, in conjunction with the other
branches of government, be entrusted with the tasks outlined? If
so, by what criteria should decisions be made?
For all of their shortcomings, the federal judges are probably
Jo L. DUGUIT, LAW IN THE MODERN STATE 26 (H. Laski trans. 1919).
[Vol. 80
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better-suited than other existing governmental institutions to im-
pose procedural due process norms on the corporate community;
to do so, they need only continue from a line of cases already
decided.
Since there is as yet no comprehensive and accepted theory of
group-State relationships to guide legislators and since the as-
sociation, individual and State are in constantly changing equi-
librium, it may be that the harmonizing of these three elements,
which Act on regards as "the true aim of politics," is best car-
ried out through the flexible processes of a widely-competent
judiciary; and it is partly for this reason that the pluralistic
character of the State appears more securely established in
America than in any other country."
Lower federal courts, but not, generally speaking, the Supreme
Court,"2 seem to be moving in that direction. 3 Sooner or later, the
Supreme Court will bow, as it did in the 1930s, to pressures and
will recognize the concept of private governments.
That leaves unanswered the toughest problem of all: the cri-
teria of judgment. Here I maintain that the time has come for a
"jurisprudence of welfare."'4 This is not the time to spell out that
concept in detail, but one dimension must be considered:
"welfare" must include national-interest decisions. The Supreme
Court already has moved in that direction, without using the term,
in beginning to create a concept of constitutional duty.5 That
trend should be continued.
I am not advocating what was once denounced as
"government by judiciary."4 The court system is only one of the
organs of government. But judges do have a role to play that in-
cludes setting a standard, or, in Bryce's words, acting as a
"national conscience." Emphatically, that does not mean that
judges should or will always prevail. It does mean that judges have
L. WEBB, LEGAL PERsoNALiTY AND POLITICAL PLURALISM 194 (1958).
'2 Cf. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARV. L. Rzv. 489 (1977).
11 E.g., Judge Frank Johnson of Alabama in, inter alia, Wyatt v. Stickney, 325
F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
" Pekelis, supra note 8; Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitu-
tional Adjudication, 27 U. Cmi. L. REv. 661 (1960).
" See Miller, Toward A Concept of Constitutional Duty, 1968 Sup. CT. REv.
199 (1968).
L. BouDmi, GOVERNMNr BY JUDICARY (1932).
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a continuing and important duty to perform-that of helping to
translate the ideals of the Constitution into operational reality.
7
11 See Miller, Judicial Activism and American Constitutionalism: Some Notes
and Reflections (to be published in a forthcoming volume of NOMOS: The Year-
book of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy).
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